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POLICY CHALLENGE
EU policies have been insufficient to solve the problem for three reasons: they
have failed to recognise the possibility of insolvency and have addressed all
crises as if they were pure liquidity crises; they have failed to address system-
ically the interdependence between banking and sovereign crises and cross-
country interdependence; and they have been reactive rather than proactive,
squandering credibility because of inadequate responses. A swift, radical and
comprehensive solution is now
needed comprising a plan to
restore banking-sector sound-
ness; revising EU assistance
facilities and restructuring of
public debt where needed; and
fostering adjustment and growth
by promoting budgetary consoli-
dation and competitiveness-
enhancing domestic reforms in
peripheral countries.
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SUMMARYThe euro area’s sovereign debt crisis continues though significant
steps have been taken to resolve it. European Union and euro-area crisis
mechanisms have been set up, and financial assistance has been provided to
Greece and Ireland. Governments have implemented severe austerity meas-
ures and started to put in place structural reform programmes. And the Euro-
pean Central Bank has embarked on a (controversial) peripheral sovereign
debt purchase programme, while continuing to provide liquidity to euro-area
banks. But these measures have not restored calm to markets. In early Febru-
ary 2011, spreads on 10-year government bonds issued by Greece, Ireland,
Portugal and Spain were all higher than they were in April 2010, before rescue
measures started to be implemented.
Source: Bruegel. See Table 2 for explanations.
Euro-area exposure map, end-2010 (€ bn)b
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A COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH TO THE EURO-AREA DEBT CRISIS
1. Our criterion for
focusing on these coun-
tries is the level of
interest-rate spreads on
long-term government
bonds. We call them
‘peripheral countries’,
because this is the
standard expression
used by others. We
could have spoken of
‘high-spread countries’.
2. Levels in 2011 are
forecast to remain
below 70, 90 and 110
percent of GDP, respec-
tively, in Spain, Portugal
and Ireland.
THE COUNTRIES MOST AFFECTED
by the euro-area crisis – Greece,
Ireland, Portugal and Spain
1 –
share many common traits. They
have spent and lived beyond their
means by accumulating private
and/or public debt and running
large current account deficits.
Nominal wages have also grown
beyond what is justified by pro-
ductivity gains, resulting in prices
growing too fast relative to the rest
of the euro area (Figure 1). In
some cases (Ireland) price diver-
gence essentially took place in the
non-traded sector – especially
construction and services –
whereas in other countries the
traded sector – especially manu-
facturing – was also affected.
Such behaviour, and the policies
that made it possible, was funda-
mentally at odds with euro partici-
pation. 
In the last two years adjustment
has started in these countries and
major policy measures have been
taken. Results are already visible
in Ireland.
However, as argued by Marzinotto
et al (2010), the Greek crisis
stands apart from those in the
other peripheral countries. First,
Greece's public debt predicament
has arisen mainly because of pub-
lic finance mismanagement, while
banking  problems have played a
secondary role. Second, with a
debt-to-GDP ratio scheduled to
exceed 150 percent, Greece is
clearly on the verge of insolvency.
By contrast, in Ireland and Spain,
the public finance consequences
of private-sector debt accumula-
tion is the main reason for sol-
vency concerns, not least because
of the cost of rescuing insolvent
banks. Public debt levels in Ireland,
Portugal and Spain are more man-
ageable than in Greece
2. 
This assessment is confirmed by a
forward-looking evaluation of the
public debt situation in the four
countries (Box 1). Under Consen-
sus Economics (2010) forecasts
of GDP growth, and an optimistic
evolution of market interest rates
(in the case of Greece, a reduction
of spreads vis-à-vis Germany from
970 basis points today to 350 in
2014), the adjustment needs are
of a frightening magnitude, not
only in Greece but also in Ireland.
This is even truer under more cau-
tious growth and interest rate
assumptions (Figure 2).
It is not only the size of the adjust-
ment effort that matters. The key
indicator of solvency is the size of
the primary budget surplus. This
needs to be maintained over a
period of years to achieve, in the
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2015 (% GDP) under different macroeconomic scenarios and
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3. Like many countries
the Greek state has
assets, including signif-
icant holdings of land.
These could potentially
serve as collateral to
guarantee loans but
even a major divesti-
ture of public property
would be insufficient to
modify the conclusion.   
4. Considering the cur-
rent official lending
rates to Ireland, a 3.7
percent persistent pri-
mary surplus would be
needed from 2015 in
the optimistic scenario,
and 6.1 percent in the
cautious scenario, to
reduce the debt ratio to
60 percent between
2014 to 2034, accord-
ing to our calculations.
See Table 1 for the
impact of possible poli-
cies and a fall in market
interest rates on these
results.
medium term, a gradual return to
safe levels of public debt. Here
Greece stands apart from the other
countries. Even in the optimistic
scenario, the primary surplus
required to reduce the debt ratio to
60 percent of GDP by 2034 would
be 8.4 percent of GDP. It would
reach 14.5 percent of GDP under
the cautious scenario. This implies
devoting between one-fifth and
one-third of tax revenues to inter-
est payments on the public debt.
Over the last 50 years, no OECD
country (except Norway, thanks to
tainable remains within the range
of what has been achieved
historically
4.  
However, the possibility of restruc-
turing Greek sovereign debt has
met with total opposition both
from the Greek government and
other euro-area countries. The
main argument seems to be that it
could create contagion effects and
spillovers, since much Greek debt
is held by euro-area banks (mainly
France and Germany), which
invested heavily in higher-yielding
peripheral bonds.
There is also a ‘wait-and-see’ atti-
tude: it is hoped that Greek reforms
will transform the economy, put-
ting it on a faster-track growth
path, thereby alleviating the situa-
tion. It is also hoped that time will
help weaker euro-area banks to
restore solvency, so that they are
in better shape for restructuring at
a later date. 
History suggests, however, that a
‘wait-and-see’ approach is a dubi-
ous strategy. Although clearly
desirable, reforms and growth
acceleration are difficult and time-
consuming processes. The linger-
ing threat of restructuring is likely
to be economically and financially
damaging. Moreover, as official
creditors - EU partners and the
International Monetary Fund (IMF)
- are gradually substituting
Greece's private creditors, post-
ponement of restructuring would
imply, to keep the debt ratio sus-
tainable, either a restructuring of
official loans, or a significantly
higher eventual haircut on private
claims.         
oil surpluses) has sustained a pri-
mary surplus above six percent of
GDP. Even less ambitious targets
would require politically unrealis-
tic surpluses
3.
Our conclusion therefore is that
Greece has become insolvent. Fur-
ther lending without a large
enough debt reduction is not
viable. This does not apply to Ire-
land which also needs to carry out
a major budgetary adjustment, but
where the primary surplus
required to keep the debt ratio sus-
BOX 1: SUSTAINABILITY ASSESSMENT
We examine two scenarios:
Optimistic scenario:
• Interest rate spreads against German Bunds are optimistically
assumed to fall by 2014 from the current high levels to 350 bps in
Greece, 200 bps in Ireland, 150 bps in Portugal and 100 bps in Spain,
and are assumed to stay at these levels.
• Consensus Economics GDP growth forecasts.
Cautious scenario:
• Expected interest rates are calculated using the expectation hypothe-
sis of the term structure, leading to considerably higher interest rates
than in the optimistic scenario.
• Lower growth and inflation compared to the optimistic scenario due to
efforts to regain competitiveness, especially in Greece, Portugal and Spain.
In both scenarios we use estimates from Barclays Capital on potential
additional bank recapitalisation by governments (for Ireland and Spain,
their high-risk estimate): €10 billion in Greece, €31.5 billion in Ireland,
€10 billion in Portugal and €75 billion in Spain. We take into account the
€17.5 billion that the Irish government has put aside from its cash
reserves and liquid assets to support banks. The Spanish value does not
include government support already provided. We remain on the conser-
vative side by not assuming any privatisation revenue.
The primary balance (in percentage of GDP) in Greece and Ireland is
assumed to evolve according to the EU-IMF programme assumptions. For
Portugal and Spain we use the European Commission's November 2010
forecast up to 2012, and assume that the primary balance will improve by
1.5 percent of GDP both in 2013 and 2014.
With the above assumptions, we calculated the persistent primary bal-
ance needed from 2015 onwards in order to (a) stabilise the debt/GDP
ratio at its 2015 level, (b) reduce the debt/GDP ratio from its simulated
2014 level to 60 percent of GDP (the Maastricht criterion) by 2034.
Darvas et al (2011) present the detailed assumptions and calculations.b
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5. We only consider here
buy-backs from the ECB,
which is feasible without
any market interference.
Note also that as the cur-
rent market value of ECB
holdings is close to their
value at the time of pur-
chase, we consider this
retrocession to be
broadly neutral for the
ECB profit-and-loss
account.
6. Obviously calculations
only apply to measures
that are currently appli-
cable. For example, we
only consider maturity
extension for the coun-
tries (Greece and Ire-
land) that benefit from
financial assistance; for
Portugal we only con-
sider the buy-back of
current ECB bond hold-
ings from a 30-year 3.5
percent loan.
7. This assumes that
assistance loans will be
exempt from restructur-
ing and that market reac-
tion to the debt
reduction will result in a
drop of the spread vis-à-
vis Germany to 200
basis points. Under these
conditions, from 2015 a
6 percent persistent pri-
mary surplus (the pro-
gramme assumption) is
needed in our cautious
scenario, with a 3.6 per-
cent surplus in the opti-
mistic scenario, to reach
the 60 percent debt ratio
by 2034.
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ASSESSING THE SOFT OPTIONS
To be fair, the EU has moved away
from complete denial of the Greek
debt situation to looking for a mid-
dle way between adjustment and
debt restructuring. Table 1 gives
for the peripheral countries an
assessment of what the effects
might be of three types of meas-
ures that are currently under
consideration: 
• A lowering of the interest rate
charged on all official EU loans
(IMF rates cannot be lowered)
to 3.5 percent annually;
• An extension of the maturity of
all official EU loans to 30 years,
and the transformation of the
Greek IMF Stand-by Agreement
into an Extended Fund Facility
(which would extend the repay-
ment date from 2018 to 2023,
as in Ireland); 
• The purchase by the European
Financial Stability Facility
(EFSF) of all government bonds
currently held by the European
Central Bank within the frame-
work of its Securities Market
Programme and the retroces-
sion of the corresponding hair-
cut to the issuing country
5.
We also provide an evaluation of
the effect of a drop of 100 basis
points in market yields, and the
joint impact of the three policies
and the drop in market yields,
even though it is difficult to assess
the expected market reaction to
these measures
6.
Each measure would clearly help
reduce Greece’s debt burden both
directly and indirectly via lower
market interest rates. However,
our calculations indicate that even
if all the measures were applied it
would still not be enough to return
Greece to solvency. The primary
budget surplus requirement would
still be unrealistically high.
Furthermore, the current stance of
‘no default now, but possible
default on bonds issued from
2013’ is inconsistent and not
credible. Up to 2012, markets will
price in the default option, making
it difficult for troubled govern-
ments to borrow. From 2013, if the
stance is indeed maintained, the
Greek government will be unable to
issue bonds. However, a second
official lending programme for
Greece in 2013 would likely meet
even more political resistance
from euro-area partners and would
further increase the share of offi-
cial creditors in Greek debt.
A debt reduction is therefore nec-
essary for Greece. We estimate
that, in order to return to a sustain-
able path and reach a 60 percent
debt-to-GDP ratio by 2034, Greece
would need (in addition to the
three measures in Table 1) a 30
percent haircut on the marketable
public debt
7.
ASSESSING POTENTIAL
SPILLOVERS
The main obstacle to a rapid
resolution of the euro-area crisis is
the difficulty policymakers have in
tackling the spillover effects
Table 1: Assessment of alternative policies
Persistent primary surplus needed from 2015
onwards to stabilise the debt/GDP ratio at its 2015
level (% GDP)
Persistent primary surplus needed from 2015
onwards to reduce the debt/GDP ratio from its 2014
level to 60 percent by 2034 (% GDP)
Scenario
(a) (b) (c) (d) (a) (b) (c) (d)
Baseline
Deviation from baseline
Baseline
Deviation from baseline
Three
policies
100 bps
lower mkt
yields
Three poli-
cies + mkt
reaction
Three
policies
100 bps
lower mkt
yields
Three poli-
cies + mkt
reaction
Greece Optimistic 3.7 -1.3 -1.0 -2.1 8.4 -1.8 -0.8 -2.4
Greece Cautious 10.5 -2.7 -1.0 -3.4 14.5 -3.0 -0.9 -3.6
Ireland Optimistic 0.7 -0.5 -0.6 -1.0 3.7 -0.8 -0.4 -1.1
Ireland Cautious 3.3 -0.8 -0.5 -1.2 6.1 -0.9 -0.4 -1.3
Portugal Optimistic 1.2 -0.1 -0.7 -0.7 2.9 -0.1 -0.6 -0.8
Portugal Cautious 4.1 -0.1 -0.7 -0.8 5.8 -0.1 -0.7 -0.8
Spain Optimistic 0.5 -0.6 1.6 -0.6
Spain Cautious 2.7 -0.7 3.8 -0.7
Source: Bruegel. Note: Column (d) is not the sum of columns (b) and (c) because the marginal impact of policy measures is smaller when market
interest rates are lower.b
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8.  See Darvas et al
(2011) for details.
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countries would remain limited.
The fear of a domino effect is
understandable, but exaggerated.
Table 2 also shows that spillover
effects from crises in other coun-
tries are clearly different. The
exposure of euro-area banks to
Irish sovereign risk is small and it
is really exposure to banks that
matters. Exposure to Portugal is
limited. Only Spain is really sys-
temic, through both the sovereign
and the banking channels.    
A COMPREHENSIVE SOLUTION
A comprehensive solution to the
crisis would have three planks:
• A plan to restore banking-sector
soundness; 
• Resolution of sovereign debt
crises; 
• A strategy to foster growth and
competitiveness.
Strengthening the euro-area bank-
ing system
Our assumptions are deliberately
cautious, but we still assess the
spillover risks to be manageable
and conclude that only Greece is in
need of a public debt reduction. We
are aware, however, that our infor-
mation is incomplete.
Our estimates of financial interde-
pendence in the euro area show
the exposure of peripheral banks
to peripheral sovereigns, and of
non-peripheral banks to both
peripheral banks and sovereigns.
But what is missing from our map-
ping is the exposure of peripheral
banks to potentially non-perform-
ing loans and the resulting risk for
banks in the rest of the euro area,
and for sovereigns in both periph-
eral and non-peripheral countries,
should banks need to be recapi-
talised with public funds. This gap
was supposed to have been filled
by the European stress tests pub-
lished in July 2010. Unfortunately
the stress tests were totally dis-
credited by subsequent develop-
ments in Irish banks, leading to
market concerns that the position
of euro-area banks may be far
worse than currently admitted.
The implementation of rigorous
between banking and sovereign
difficulties and across countries in
the absence of European
sovereign debt and banking crisis
resolution mechanisms.    
In order to assess what needs to
be done, we start from a simplified
map of bank and sovereign inter-
dependence in the periphery coun-
tries, and between periphery
banks and those elsewhere in the
euro area (front-page figure and
Table 2). Although drawing up such
a map involves a number of
assumptions
8, it provides a rea-
sonably accurate representation
of the actual situation.
Starting with Greece, our esti-
mates indicate that the spillover
from a sustainability-restoring
haircut on sovereign debt would
have a manageable impact on
banks in the rest of the euro area.
Some would no doubt need recapi-
talisation, but even assuming that
recapitalisation would be borne by
the public purse (a disputable
choice and therefore an extreme
assumption), the impact on the
public finances of other euro-area
Table 2: Estimated exposure to periphery government debt and banking system (€ bn), end-2010
Greece Ireland Portugal Spain Total 
Total government debt (at face value) 325 153 142 677 1297
of which held by :
Domestic banks 68 11 19 227 336
Rest of euro-area banks 52 14 33 79 166
Other banks 6 9 5 24 43
Non-banks (both domestic and foreign) 119 97 64 347 627
ECB 50 22 21 0 93
IMF, EU and official lenders 32 0 0 0 32
Ratio of average market value to face value of government debt 0.75 0.85 0.9 1
Foreign banks' exposure to national banking systems 10 119 43 209 381
of which euro-area banks 6 66 37 154 264
Eurosystem lending to banks 95 132 41 65 333
Source: Bruegel. For data sources and explanations see Darvas et al (2011).and credible stress tests is there-
fore an absolute priority for the
euro area. Because EU banking
supervisors squandered credibility
in the previous round of stress
tests, we advocate involving the
IMF and possibly the Bank for
International Settlements, in the
next round of tests. We suggest
that the March 2011 European
Council adopts the necessary
measures to ensure that the
forthcoming stress tests be as rig-
orous and credible as possible.
Once such tests have been carried
out, euro-area countries must pro-
ceed immediately with bank
restructuring where necessary,
which should imply the recapitali-
sation of viable institutions and
the closure of non-viable ones. To
this end, EFSF funding should be
made available to governments.
The restructuring of some banks in
core countries is likely to be nec-
essary, especially if bank losses
turn out to be significant in Spain,
the only peripheral country where
restructuring would, according to
our estimates, have a significant
spillover effect on the rest of the
euro area.
Bank restructuring would be accel-
erated if EU countries were to intro-
duce special bank resolution
mechanisms in their domestic leg-
islation, as proposed by the Euro-
pean Commission. In line with the
February 2011 German proposal
9,
we advocate that heads of state
and government agree in March to
put in place such mechanisms
without delay. But beyond
national efforts, there is a strong
rationale for the creation of a
b
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9. See, for example, the
Financial Timesof 3
February 2011, 'Euro-
zone members are
negotiating a “grand
bargain” to tackle the
bloc’s debt crisis'.
A COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH TO THE EURO-AREA DEBT CRISIS
temporary ‘European Bank
Treuhand’ (Posen and Véron,
2009), to catalyse recapitalisation
and manage any distressed
assets that may fall into public
ownership, while keeping fiscal
outlays in national hands.
Beyond the immediate short term,
there is an obvious need to put in
place a solid European banking
supervision and resolution frame-
work. One lesson from the crisis is
that such a framework must go
beyond coordination between
national institutions. Nothing less
than supranational banking super-
vision and resolution bodies can
handle the kind of financial inter-
dependence that now exists in
Europe. Ideally, such bodies
should cover all EU countries,
since they all belong to a single
financial market. However, in case
this proves to be politically unreal-
istic, euro-area countries should
create their own institutions.
Before the crisis, the creation of
EU- or euro-area banking supervi-
sion and resolution institutions
was considered unacceptable by
European countries because it
would amount to the pooling of
risks associated with bank fail-
ures. The crisis has shown that the
absence of such institutions
imposes even greater burden-
sharing on countries, especially
within the euro area, where the
ECB has been forced to act as the
lender of last resort to banks that
may turn out to be insolvent.
Resolution of sovereign debt
crises 
Our calculations have shown that
it is preferable to implement a sig-
nificant reduction of Greek debt
sooner rather than later.   
It would clearly be less disruptive
financially to achieve a reduction
in the debt level through voluntary
exchanges rather than through
across-the-board debt restructur-
ing. This justifies giving the EFSF
the mission and the financial
means to carry out such opera-
tions on a significant scale. Euro
area leaders should agree to this at
the March European Council, as
part of the overall package under
consideration. The EFSF should
immediately buy from the ECB
debt securities purchased within
the framework of the Sovereign
Market Programme.   
A debt exchange however is not
without problems. In particular, a
voluntary exchange will only be
marginally effective as long as the
EU sticks to its no-restructuring
commitment because, if credible,
this commitment is an incentive to
hold rather than sell the asset. In
order to make debt-exchange
schemes effective, public authori-
ties would need to convey to mar-
kets their determination to
achieve a reduction of public debt
to a sustainable level. This requires
on their part a recognition of the
unsustainable character of the
present course, and a joint evalua-
tion by the Commission, the ECB
and the IMF of the amount of debt
reduction needed.
Restructuring would not be easy
either, both because of its impact
on financial institutions that have
not marked debt securities to mar-
ket (which is the case for manybanks) and because of the senior-
ity issue. Currently, bilateral gov-
ernment loans and EFSF loans do
not enjoy formal seniority status.
Yet it would be unthinkable to bail
in those EU members who came to
the rescue of their ailing partners,
especially since the IMF, which
provided parallel loans, enjoys
senior creditor status. If formal
restructuring is needed, we advo-
cate that it takes inspiration from
the mechanism presented in
Gianviti et al (2010).
In both cases, the burden of
adjustment should not fall only on
private bondholders. First,
investors should be offered a vari-
ety of new, guaranteed instru-
ments (eg Delpla and von
Weizsäcker, 2011). Second,
investors should be able to benefit
from an upturn in economic condi-
tions through eg GDP-indexed
bonds. Third, Greece should post
collateral to guarantee the new
debt instruments.
Furthermore, Greece and Ireland
currently benefit from loans from
EU states or the EFSM/EFSF at rel-
atively high interest rates com-
pared to the rates at which these
countries or institutions are able
to borrow. This was intended to sig-
nal that these loans should not be
regarded as concessionary, partly
in response to fear of recourse to
the German constitutional court
for breach of the EU treaty’s no
bail-out clause. However,  high
interest rates have caused politi-
cal tensions in the borrowing coun-
tries and reduced the domestic
ownership of the programmes.
High rates have also weakened the
credibility of these programmes
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10. The Hungarian gov-
ernment launched in
July 2009 a five-year
euro-denominated bond
with a coupon of 6.75
percent. Following the
success of this issuance
it has not drawn any-
thing from the remaining
portion of the assistance
programmes. The
Latvian and Romanian
governments have also
not drawn the full avail-
able amounts. 
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by aggravating somewhat the
Greek and Irish sustainability prob-
lem. Interest rates on official loans
should correspond to the lender's
borrowing cost, plus an opera-
tional margin, in line with EU assis-
tance to Hungary, Latvia and
Romania. The experience of the
three countries suggests that
countries may be willing not to
draw the full amount of the prefer-
ential-rate assistance when rea-
sonable market borrowing
conditions are restored, in order to
boost market confidence
10. Longer
maturity EU assistance would also
reduce the magnitude of haircut
on marketable Greek debt and
improve the sustainability of other
countries receiving assistance.
Fostering growth in the peripheral
countries
Given the size of public and private
debt in the peripheral countries,
regaining sustainability will mean
a combination of lower living stan-
dards and higher production, espe-
cially in the tradable sector.
Economic policy should be geared,
first and foremost, towards imple-
menting domestic reforms to
increase employment and produc-
tivity. However, even if successful,
these will take time to produce
results. In the meantime, growth
will remain subdued and debt,
though reduced, will remain high.
Private and public sector efforts to
pay off their debts will have a neg-
ative impact on growth, and low
growth will it make more difficult
to reduce debt levels. These coun-
tries are also confronted with the
risk of debt deflation, because
restoring competitiveness in the
tradable sector will require low
price increases and perhaps even
deflation.
In order to break this vicious circle,
peripheral countries need to first
stabilise and then reduce their
debt levels while accelerating the
pace of economic reform. The EU
can and should help with this by
fostering reforms and growth in
these countries. 
We have already emphasised the
potential role of better terms for
conditional financial assistance
and the implementation of com-
prehensive measures to exit the
debt deadlock. Currently, private
investment is being held back and
public borrowing costs are high
due to lingering uncertainty about
banking sector resolution and
sovereign defaults.
But the EU should also do more
with the instruments at its dis-
posal. We strongly advocate a
temporary refocusing of the struc-
tural funds earmarked for the
peripheral countries, with monies
mobilised to support new growth
strategies. As argued in Marzinotto
(2011), this requires front-loading
EU structural spending (without
changing its distribution by coun-
try), so that it can contribute to
fostering reform and growth during
the most acute phase of the
adjustment. This also requires a
joined-up, coordinated approach,
including with the EU-IMF pro-
gramme, instead of the current silo
approach.  We suggest the March
2011 European Council adopts a
programme along these lines.
In the longer term the EU can also
help by making better use of itsb
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budget. The discussion on the next
2014-20 multiannual financial
framework is an opportunity for
fresh thinking about new ways to
foster investment in the four coun-
tries and other crisis-affected
countries, especially in central and
eastern Europe.
CONCLUSION
For several weeks there has been
an expectation among political
observers and market participants
that the March European Council
will deliver measures amounting
to a comprehensive solution to the
euro-area crisis. This expectation
was reinforced by the 4 February
2011 European Council, where
euro-area heads of state and gov-
ernment announced their inten-
tion to finalise in March a
‘comprehensive strategy to pre-
serve financial stability’. 
We argue that a comprehensive
fostering adjustment and growth
in peripheral countries through
budgetary consolidation and com-
petitiveness-enhancing meas-
ures, and through mobilisation
and better implementation of EU
structural funds. 
Too much time has been lost, too
much confidence has been dented
and too much credibility has been
squandered in the past year. Build-
ing on important decisions already
taken, EU leaders should move
decisively and agree on a compre-
hensive package along these lines
at the March 2011 summit. This
would be a major contribution to
the cohesion and the revival of the
euro area.
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approach must start by recognis-
ing two basic facts. First, peripheral
countries face a huge challenge in
adjusting their weak economies
and avoiding a vicious circle of
high private and public debt and
low growth. Second, banks and
sovereigns throughout the euro
area are closely interdependent.
Starting from these two facts,
which we have documented in this
policy brief, we propose a compre-
hensive strategy comprising three
components: the cleaning up of
banks, wherever needed and
simultaneously throughout the
euro area, based on the results of a
rigorous stress test given added
credibility by the involvement of
the IMF and possibly the BIS; revi-
sion of the conditions of EU assis-
tance programmes, further
empowering the EFSF and the
reduction of the public debt in
Greece, the only euro-area country
which has become insolvent;
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